Recent years have seen the advent of two feminist judgment-writing projects, the 
substantive equality continues, the promise of genuine substantive equality is fading and the voices of equality advocates are being muted. More and more frequently, the courts are denying intervenor status to women's and social justice groups. They think they have heard what we have to say, even though, as new and complex equality issues continue to surface in these troubling times, we are bursting with new ideas and new directions to explore in the pursuit of equality. When we are allowed in, our arguments before the court are too often dismissed or ignored. (Majury 2006, pp. 1-2, footnote omitted) In this context, a group of LEAF activists, lawyers and academics meeting to discuss future strategies, came up with the idea of rewriting the recent Supreme Court decisions that had got it wrong on s 15 (Majury 2006, p. 2) . The WCC was conceived as a 'higher' court that would 'review' the Supreme Court decisions. Their focus was narrow: to rewrite the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence in order to demonstrate how a more developed substantive equality analysis could be incorporated into the interpretation and The FJP, by contrast, adopted a much wider remit. Inspired by the WCC's example but lacking an equivalent constitutional or human rights focus, three English academics decided to set up a feminist judgment-writing project by calling widely for expressions of interest from feminist legal academics to write the 'missing' feminist judgment in a case of their choice. This call was predicated on the assumption that the law is full of decisions which feminists might perceive to be unjust, and that feminist legal scholars working in different areas would have their own particular examples which, in their view, cried out for rewriting. This assumption proved to be fruitful, and a substantial number of expressions of interest were received across a wide range of subject areas. Ultimately, the FJP resulted in the publication of 23 judgments in a book titled Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hunter et al. 2010a) . 4 The title reflects the broader objective of the FJP to demonstrate how feminist legal theory could be given practical effect in judgment form.
Although there are obvious differences between the WCC and the FJP, my interest here is to focus on their commonalities. Both projects represent a new and different kind of feminist intervention in law -a kind of hybrid form of critique and law reform project. Firstly, they engage in detailed criticism of the decisions in specific cases and present an alternative feminist analysis of the issues and legal principles involved.
But this is not done simply as an academic exercise or for an academic audience. They
Published in Feminist Legal Studies Vol 20, No 2 (2012) DOI 0.1007/s10691-012-9202-0 ________________________________________________________________________ 5 want their judgments to be taken seriously. They want activists, lawyers and judges to be influenced by their reasoning and so, indirectly, to change the law or at least to contribute to its development (Majury 2006, p. 6; Hunter et al. 2010b, pp. 27-28) . Secondly, by appropriating legal personas and forms, they powerfully demonstrate that, at the time these cases were decided and with the legal and other materials then available to the court, the cases could have been reasoned and/or decided differently. In doing so, they expose the contingency and biases of existing decisions and disrupt the unique authority of the courts and legal decision-making. On the other hand, the legal forms they appropriate remain largely unquestioned. They accept judgment-writing as a particular genre subject to particular constraints and strive to operate within that genre and subject to the same constraints as those binding appellate judges, rather than attempting to open up legal forms or legal method (Majury 2006, p. 6; Hunter et al. 2010b, pp. 5-6) .
It is also notable that the WCC and the FJP are both collective, collaborative enterprises. In each case, while individual judgments were drafted by one or two members, draft judgments were shared, discussed and debated collectively among a larger group. The WCC originally had 12, now 16 members. The FJP involved 29 judgment-writers, plus an additional 20 participants who wrote explanatory 'commentaries' on the cases and 14 further discussants who provided comments and feedback to the judgment-writers during project workshops. The collaborative nature of the work reinforced the sense of contributing to a shared feminist endeavour, notwithstanding significant differences of feminist analysis and approach that emerged in discussions over the cases (Majury 2006, pp. 7-8; Hunter et al. 2010b, pp 4, 12-13) .
Indeed, an important point emphasised by both projects has been the fact that feminism is 
Smart's Critique of Law
In Feminism and the Power of Law, Carol Smart mounted a sustained critique of law and, as a consequence, of feminist engagements with law. Following -and extendingFoucault, she argued that law is a powerful discourse which has exclusionary and damaging effects for women. The first strand of her argument is that law represents women and gender in a way that does not merely ignore or leave women out of account, but that actively disqualifies women's experience and knowledge (Smart 1989, pp. 2, 11, 21 'discovering' the relevant legal principles through the selection of precedents and/or statutory interpretation, and applying the law to the facts to arrive at a conclusion -is presumed to be neutral (p. 21), objective and impartial, and always to produce the 'correct' decision (p. 10). In a similar vein, Mary Jane Mossman identified legal method as a major obstacle to feminist interventions in law, and argued that legal method is structured in such a way as to be impervious to a feminist perspective (Mossman 1987, p. 165).
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The feminist judgment-writing projects flatly contradict -or attempt to contradict -these arguments. Rather than accepting that legal method is impervious to a feminist perspective, they attempt to introduce a feminist perspective into law by means of legal method. While they accept that legal method does indeed confer considerable power upon law's claims to truth, they attempt to harness legal method precisely in order to qualify feminist knowledge about women, to transform it into legal knowledge and thereby to invest it with legal authority. First is the fact that legal method is considerably more open ended and produces less determinate results than Smart and Mossman suggest. Even within positivist jurisprudence, it has been recognised that there are points at which the law 'runs out' and judges are required to exercise unfettered discretion in deciding some cases (Hart 1961, pp. 123-124 In each case, the legal principles that would produce a just result for the individuals involved in the case would not necessarily serve the interests of some other women and girls. For the most part, the feminist judgment-writers grappled conscientiously with this risk, and attempted to craft principles that were sufficiently contextualised so as not to foreclose the possibility of a different outcome for differently-situated women.
Nevertheless, this dilemma raises the serious issue that legal method sometimes forces 15 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd: see Hunter et al. (2010a, pp. 59-82) .
16 Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley: see Hunter et al. (2010a, pp. 292-307) . 17 Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence): see Hunter et al. (2010a, pp. 114-133. 18 Sheffield City Council v E: see Hunter et al. (2010a, pp.346-362) .
19 R v Brown: see Hunter et al. (2010a, pp. 241-254 open to all sorts of critiques, but they have delegitimised some forms of discrimination and conferred symbolic recognition in place of stigmatisation. Sandland (1995) suggests a need to resist an overly pessimistic reading of legal reforms -that they always ultimately fail to shift the maleness of law and simply reconfigure it. He argues that there is no one, essential reading or meaning of any given reform, and that one may acknowledge, for example, that a reform has symbolic value regardless of its 'success' in achieving material change (Sandland 1995, pp. 32-33) .
Perhaps, then, it is Smart who concedes too much in asserting the futility or the ultimate danger of feminist law reform efforts.
Another element of Smart's empirical argument about the harm caused by feminist law reform is the harm that may be caused to feminism by such activities. As she notes, controversial examples of law reform such as MacKinnon's anti-pornography ordinances have exacerbated differences within feminism (or turned those differences into liabilities rather than productive possibilities) (p. 115) and has forced feminists into Indeed, it is possible for two feminist judges on the same court to deliver different opinions in the same case. As noted above, both the WCC and the FJP engendered lively debates over differing feminist approaches to many of the issues raised without precipitating splits, schisms or any need to take 'sides'. The judgments also draw upon a wide range of feminist theoretical positions (see, e.g. Hunter 2010, pp. 21-27) . In these projects, differences within feminism proved to be productive rather than destructive.
This is also likely to be the case the more diverse the real-life judiciary becomesincluding a diversity of feminists. Etherton, for example, cites US social psychology research on collegial decision-making which demonstrates that a panel of judges of the same political affiliation (Republican or Democrat) move towards a more extreme position in their decision-making in line with their politics, whereas the presence of single judge of a different political affiliation has a marked disciplining or moderating effect (Etherton 2010, p. 745) . He concludes that this highlights:
the importance on panels of appellate judges who, due to their diverse experience, can bring to bear on a case…a wider range of personal experience and judicial philosophies than would otherwise be the case.
They will thereby make it more likely that the decision, and the reasoning which underpins it, will reflect the evolving values and institutions of the community, and that relevant arguments are not overlooked or brushed The second form of evidence Smart invokes to warn feminists to "avoid the siren call of law" (1989, p. 160) is a theoretical one which relates back to legal method. That is, that legal categories and frameworks limit and distort feminist agendas (p. 115).
Women's claims, she argues, cannot simply be fitted into existing legal constructs. Law's language, methods and procedures are fundamentally anti-feminist because they bear no relationship to the concerns of women's lives (p. 160). Thus, law is not merely an instrument to be used pragmatically by feminist lawyers for their own ends (pp. 136-137, 160). If they attempt to do so, feminist legal reformers will not only fail to help women, but will end up merely legitimating and reinforcing the power of law itself (p. 161).
As with Smart's characterisation of the failure of law reforms, her characterisation of legal language, methods and procedures as "fundamentally anti-feminist" is arguably too absolutist. These theoretical claims must at least be open to empirical question. Do they hold true in practice? In this context, the feminist judgment-writing projects attempt to revise legal categories, frameworks and language by reference to the concerns of women's lives. Are their attempts successful? Given the relative paucity of feminist judgments -especially real-life ones -we are far from having sufficient experience to decide one way or the other. The jury is still out and is likely to be out for some time to come. But it seems better for feminist judgment-writing projects at least to try out the possibilities, to do so in a sustained way (rather than in the form of isolated judgments Published in Feminist Legal Studies Vol 20, No 2 (2012 ) DOI 0.1007 that may sink beneath the radar), and thereby to provide models and encouragement for this to occur in real life, than to concede defeat before even beginning.
As for reinforcing the power of law, there is little feminist judgment-writing projects can do to escape this charge. They clearly attempt to engage with law on its own terrain, and thus equally clearly accept that it plays an important role in shaping the contours of women's lives. This is, of course, often the case whether feminists like it or not. Many women do not have a choice -they are hauled before the law as defendants or victims in criminal cases and as respondents in family law cases. In other instances, legal action provides the only possible avenue of escape from a dire situation (e.g. deportation, eviction, withholding of medical treatment, mortgage foreclosure) or the only avenue of redress for an injury (e.g. discrimination). More broadly, law does have widespread material effects on women's lives. The challenge Smart issues, however, is to consider whether feminists should, as a matter of strategy, buy into law's power over women's lives, or should instead "resist...the creeping hegemony of the legal order" (p. 5). Rather than attempting to respond at this point, it is useful first to outline the alternative feminist strategies Smart proposes.
Smart's Strategic Prescriptions
Alongside her critique of law, Smart suggests a redirection of feminist strategy.
Feminism, she argues, "needs to engage with law for purposes other than law reform" (p.
164). Feminist strategy must focus on challenging law's power to define women and to disqualify feminist knowledge (pp. 2, 164) . She envisages several ways of undertaking within feminism amply demonstrates. Further, it is necessary to recognise that just like legal constructions of women, feminist counter-discourses about women are also constitutive. In order to avoid feminist alternative accounts becoming equally oppressive and constraining, therefore, they must be contextualised, contingent, subject to discussion and debate, remain open to revision, and arise from a diversity of feminist voices. As noted above, feminist judgment-writing projects seem to have greater capacity to incorporate these requirements than do feminist projects aiming at legislative reform.
Finally, both Drakopoulou (1997, p. 115) and Sandland (1995, p. 20) have taken issue with the exclusive nature of Smart's prescriptions for feminist strategy -with her argument that resistance to law is the only ethical goal for feminism, and that challenging law's power to define women is the only appropriate and effective way for feminists to critique law. These prescriptions suggest that there is a 'truth' about feminist strategy in the same way that there is a 'truth' about women to which feminists have access, and they are thus open to the same objections. Sandland in particular contests Smart's insistence that feminists should engage in deconstruction rather than reform. Surely, he argues, it is not possible to decide between these options a priori; the relative merits of one goal over another must be assessed on a case by case basis (1995, pp. 28, 35) .
Moreover, are deconstruction and reform necessarily mutually exclusive, or can deconstruction sometimes be accomplished via reform (1995, p. 28)?
Feminist judgment-writing projects appear ultimately to fall within the category of deconstruction via reform -or reform via deconstruction. They undoubtedly challenge law's power to define women and to disqualify feminist knowledge, but they do so from inside law and with the objective of changing law, of revising law's knowledge about and representations of women, and of extending legal subjectivity to women -as both the authors of decisions and the subjects upon whose experiences, activities and concerns law is founded. In doing so they fulfil Smart's injunction not to accept feminism as powerless in the face of law, but exercise collective agency to promote and encourage legal change.
Conclusion
In summary, feminist judgment-writing projects are predicated upon a rejection of some of Smart's more essentialist or categorical arguments in Feminism and the Power of Law.
They do not accept that legal method is closed and antithetical to feminism, that legal forms are essentially anti-feminist, that law reform projects are universally ineffective and harmful to women and to feminism, that feminism has access to the truth about women's lives, nor that there is any singular truth about feminist strategy. Feminist judgment-writing projects are not alone in disputing these claims; from the perspective of 2010, they appear unsustainable.
At the same time, feminist-judgment writing projects are predicated upon other elements of Smart's theoretical enterprise: her concern to highlight the power of legal discourse, to urge the importance of providing alternative accounts of women's experience, to build those accounts through working imaginatively and collectively, and to refuse to accept feminism as powerless in the face of law. And several of Smart's arguments retain continuing salience in the context of feminist judgment-writing projects.
She is right to highlight the potential problems of attempting to achieve feminist legislative reforms, of reinforcing the power of law and of contributing to legal hegemony. Her warnings that legal method may force invidious choices, may not be Thus, largely contrary to Smart's injunctions, feminist judgment-writing projects attempt to appropriate the power of law to qualify feminist knowledges, to provide alternative accounts within legal discourse, and to change legal doctrine. But largely in accordance with them, they need to remain mindful of both law's and feminism's capacity to construct totalising and constraining definitions of women and gender. The legal knowledge generated by feminist judges must remain contingent, contextualised, diverse, debated, open to critical scrutiny, and above all a collective enterprise.
Differences within feminism must remain productive rather than destructive. And judicial authority and legal decision-making must continue to be deconstructed. The concept of deconstruction via reform, and reform via deconstruction, provides a useful image for the hybrid nature of feminist-judgment writing projects, and for their ambivalent relationship with Smart's critical and strategic contentions.
